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custodian-enqueue
-----------------
We open named files from the user to parse tests.
We don't run shell commands.
custodian-dequeue
-----------------
Two tests pass arguments from the configuration file to the shell:
ping
http/https
The hostname used to ping, and the url, are both passed directly to the shell with no encoding or sanitizing.
This means a test such as the following is a risk:
$(touch /tmp/blah) must run ping.
HOWEVER the hostname will pass the following regexp:
^([^\s]+)\s+
So in real terms the only risk is commands without spaces:
$(/tmp/exploit.sh) must run ping
TODO: Fix this
General
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We decode arbitrary JSON from the queue. We should sign it, or validate it to will prevent trojan malformed
JSON from being added.
At the moment we ensure that the job-body we retrieve looks JSON-like, and decodes to a non-empty hash.
Problem: We cannot sign the body without giving away our key details.
Solution: Read /etc/custodian/salt, and store the checksum of all keys + values with that salt?
TODO
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Anything else? DoS attacks?
Steve
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